Internet Engineering Task Force H. Sharma, Ed. Internet-Draft Netskope Inc Obsoletes: 8954 (if approved) 11 April 2024 Updates: 6960 (if approved) Intended status: Standards Track Expires: 13 October 2024 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 Abstract RFC 8954 imposed the size constraints on the optional Nonce extension for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). OCSP is used for checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP request message. Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce value that is longer than 32 octets. This document updates the maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets. This document also modifies Nonce section to clearly define the encoding format and values distinctively for an easier implementation and understanding. This document obsoletes RFC 8954 and provides updated ASN.1 modules for OCSP, updates RFC 6960. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 October 2024. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Nonce Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1. Introduction Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960] and updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954] limits the maximum Nonce length to 32 octets. To support cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets. In addition, this document recommends that the OCSP client and responder use a Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets. 1.1. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 2. OCSP Extensions The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in [RFC6960] and Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC6960] also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see [RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces this section to limit the minimum and maximum length for the Nonce value. This document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in [RFC6960]. 2.1. Nonce Extension The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it would be included as one of the responseExtensions. In both the request and the response, the Nonce will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp- nonce, while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce octets. If the Nonce extension is present, then the length of the Nonce octets MUST be at least 1 octet and can be up to 128 octets. An OCSP client that implements this document MUST use a minimum length of 32 octets for Nonce octets in the Nonce extension. [RFC8954] compliant implementations will be unable to process nonces generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of the limit of 32 octets that was specified in [RFC8954]. An OCSP responder that implements this document MUST reject any OCSP request that has a Nonce octets with a length of either 0 octets or more than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960]. Responders, supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept Nonce lengths of at least 16 octets and MAY choose to ignore the Nonce extension for requests where the length of the Nonce octets is less than 16 octets or more than 32 octets. The value of the Nonce octets MUST be generated using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility with older clients that follow [RFC6960]. id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 Example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with 32 Nonce octets in hexadecimal format. 30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04 20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14 c8 Here is the decoded version of the above example. Offset, Length and Object Identifier are in decimal. Offset Length 0 47 : SEQUENCE { 2 9 : OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2) 13 34 : OCTET STRING, encapsulates { 15 32 : OCTET STRING : DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB : E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8 : } : } 3. Security Considerations The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in [RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid. Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that the response is the latest response from the server and not an old copy. 3.1. Replay Attack The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request and respond with an earlier response from the server without the Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate fields in the OCSP response. Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 4. IANA Considerations For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.1, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD1. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-88". For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.2, IANA is requested to assign an object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD2. The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-08". Acknowledgements The authors of this document wish to thank Mohit Sahni for his work to produce [RFC8954]. The authors wish to thank Russ Housley, Corey Bonnell, Michael StJohns and Carl Wallace for the feedback and suggestions. References Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, . [RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September 2007, . [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, . Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November 2020, . Informative References [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, . [Errata5891] RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960, . Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the entirity of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata id 5891 [Errata5891] as well. Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998 version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module replaces the modules Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960]. Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module present in A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1. This module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module as per the policy of the PKIX working group. A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 OCSP-2024-88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(TBD1)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS -- PKIX Certificate Extensions AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName FROM PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) } Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) }; OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { tbsRequest TBSRequest, optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL, requestList SEQUENCE OF Request, requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } Signature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING, certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) Request ::= SEQUENCE { reqCert CertID, singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } CertID ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer tryLater (3), -- Try again later -- (4) is not used sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized } ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, response OCTET STRING } BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { tbsResponseData ResponseData, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, signature BIT STRING, certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, responderID ResponderID, producedAt GeneralizedTime, -- The format for -- GeneralizedTime is as -- specified in Section -- 4.1.2.5.2 of [RFC5280] responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse, responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } ResponderID ::= CHOICE { byName [1] Name, byKey [2] KeyHash } KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key -- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the -- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding -- the tag, length, and number of unused -- bits] in the responder's certificate) Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certID CertID, certStatus CertStatus, thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL } CertStatus ::= CHOICE { good [0] IMPLICIT NULL, revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo, unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo } RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { revocationTime GeneralizedTime, revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL } UnknownInfo ::= NULL ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax } CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE { sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL } -- Object Identifiers id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp } id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 } id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 } id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 } Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 9] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 } id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 } id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 } id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 } END A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax OCSP-2024-08 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(TBD2)} DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS Extensions{}, EXTENSION FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912] {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)} AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912] {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912] {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912] {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1 FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912] {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)}; Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 10] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE { tbsRequest TBSRequest, optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL } TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL, requestList SEQUENCE OF Request, requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response, ..., re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms}} OPTIONAL } Signature ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}}, signature BIT STRING, certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) } Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128)) Request ::= SEQUENCE { reqCert CertID, singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions { {re-ocsp-service-locator, ...}} OPTIONAL } CertID ::= SEQUENCE { hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier {DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}}, issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber } OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus, responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL } OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED { successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer tryLater (3), -- Try again later -- (4) is not used sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 11] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized } RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...} ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE { responseType RESPONSE. &id ({ResponseSet}), response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE. &Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))} basicResponse RESPONSE ::= { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic } BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE { tbsResponseData ResponseData, signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}}, signature BIT STRING, certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL } ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1, responderID ResponderID, producedAt GeneralizedTime, responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse, responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce, ..., re-ocsp-extended-revoke}} OPTIONAL } ResponderID ::= CHOICE { byName [1] Name, byKey [2] KeyHash } KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key -- (excluding the tag and length fields) SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE { certID CertID, certStatus CertStatus, thisUpdate GeneralizedTime, nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL, singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl | re-ocsp-archive-cutoff | CrlEntryExtensions, ...} Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 12] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 } OPTIONAL } CertStatus ::= CHOICE { good [0] IMPLICIT NULL, revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo, unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo } RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE { revocationTime GeneralizedTime, revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL } UnknownInfo ::= NULL ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet}) ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE { issuer Name, locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax } CrlID ::= SEQUENCE { crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL, crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL, crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL } PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE { sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}}, certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}} OPTIONAL } -- Certificate Extensions ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck } -- Request Extensions re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce } re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-response } re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 13] Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-06 April 2024 id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator } re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs } -- Response Extensions re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl } re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff } re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke } -- Object Identifiers id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 } id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 } id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 } id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 } id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 } id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 } id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 } id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 } id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 } END Author's Address Himanshu Sharma (editor) Netskope Inc 2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor Santa Clara, California 95054 United States of America Email: himanshu@netskope.com URI: www.netskope.com Sharma Expires 13 October 2024 [Page 14]