| Internet-Draft | PKCS #15 Updates | December 2023 |
| Gutmann | Expires 8 June 2024 | [Page] |
This document describes updates to the PKCS #15 standard made since the original publication of the standard.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 June 2024.¶
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.¶
After the publication of the original PKCS #15 standard it saw minor updates that were only published as drafts and circulated informally among implementers, but never finalised due to the dissolution of the organisation that published the standards. Since the standard, including the updates, remains in active use today, this document gathers the updates in a single location for reference by implementers.¶
The updates cover the extension of the original PKCS #15 identifiers to handle validFrom/validTo dates for certificates and PGP/OpenPGP keys and email addresses, the addition of support for CMS Authenticated-Enveloped-Data, and support for cryptographic binding of public-key components to private-key ones.¶
Since names and definitions have changed across the different drafts (for example v1.0 used PKCS15XXXAttributes while v1.1 and later used XXXXAttributes), this document uses the v1.1 ASN.1 module pkcs-15v1_1.asn as its baseline.¶
PKCS #15 v1.0 didn't support the validFrom/validTo dates that are required for certificates, these were added in the PKCS #15 v1.2 draft and extend the CommonCertificateAttributes to add:¶
validFrom GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
validTo [4] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
¶
For context, the full CommonCertificateAttributes are then:¶
CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
iD Identifier,
authority BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
identifier CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
certHash [0] OOBCertHash OPTIONAL,
...,
trustedUsage [1] Usage OPTIONAL,
identifiers [2] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier{{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
implicitTrust [3] BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE
validFrom GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
validTo [4] GeneralisedTime OPTIONAL,
}
¶
PKCS #15 v1.0, designed for use with smart cards, didn't support PGP/OpenPGP or email use, making it difficult to implement PKCS #11 with PKCS #15 as the storage format. The PKCS #15 v1.2 draft extended CredentialIdentifier to include these additional IDs, which extend the existing KeyIdentifiers values to add pgp, openPGP, and uri identifiers:¶
KeyIdentifiers KEY-IDENTIFIER ::= {
issuerAndSerialNumber |
issuerAndSerialNumberHash |
subjectKeyId |
subjectKeyHash |
issuerKeyHash |
issuerNameHash |
subjectNameHash |
pgp |
openPGP |
uri
...
}
pgp KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
{SYNTAX OCTET STRING SIZE(8) IDENTIFIED BY 8}
-- RFC 4880 V3 (PGP 2.x) key ID
openPGP KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
{SYNTAX OCTET STRING SIZE(8) IDENTIFIED BY 9}
-- RFC 4880 V4 key ID
uri KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
{SYNTAX UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY 10}
-- Typically email address but may be a more general URI
¶
PKCS #15 v1.0 predates the existence of CMS Authenticated-Enveloped-Data, which was added in the PKCS #15 v1.2 draft by extending the ObjectValue/ PathOrObjects CHOICE to include a new content type AuthEnvelopedData alongside the existing EnvelopedData. For ObjectValue this is:¶
direct-protected-auth [4] AuthEnvelopedData {Type},
¶
For PathOrObjects this is:¶
direct-protected-auth [4] AuthEnvelopedData {SEQUENCE OF ObjectType},
¶
Note that the tags jump from the v1.1 'direct-protected [2] EnvelopedData' to 'direct-protected-auth [4] AuthEnvelopedData', the [3] tag was used for another object type whose purpose is now lost. For context, the full ObjectValue / PathOrObjects are then:¶
ObjectValue { Type } ::= CHOICE {
indirect ReferencedValue {Type},
direct [0] Type,
indirect-protected [1] ReferencedValue {EnvelopedData {Type}},
direct-protected [2] EnvelopedData {Type},
direct-protected-auth [4] AuthEnvelopedData {Type}
}
PathOrObjects {ObjectType} ::= CHOICE {
path Path,
objects [0] SEQUENCE OF ObjectType,
...,
indirect-protected [1] ReferencedValue {EnvelopedData {SEQUENCE OF ObjectType}},
direct-protected [2] EnvelopedData {SEQUENCE OF ObjectType}
direct-protected-auth [4] AuthEnvelopedData {SEQUENCE OF ObjectType},
}
¶
An update to the PKCS #15 v1.2 draft provided for cryptographic binding between the private key and public key data. This protects the otherwise typically unprotected public-key objects from undetectable manipulation. This cryptographic binding is added by extending the existing privateXXXKey types with new privateXXXKeyExt types that include the cryptographic binding:¶
PrivateKeyType ::= CHOICE {
privateRSAKey PrivateKeyObject {PrivateRSAKeyAttributes},
privateECKey [0] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateECKeyAttributes},
privateDHKey [1] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateDHKeyAttributes},
privateDSAKey [2] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateDSAKeyAttributes},
privateKEAKey [3] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKEAKeyAttributes},
privateRSAKeyExt [4] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateRSAKeyAttributesExt},
privateECKeyExt [5] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateECKeyAttributesExt},
privateDSAKeyExt [6] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateDSAKeyAttributesExt},
...
}
¶
The Ext variants wrap the original XXXPrivateKeyObject in an additional SEQUENCE that adds an [ESSCertIDv2] field, with the ESSCertIDv2 restricted to contain only a SHA-2 hash of the public key data in SubjectPublicKeyInfo form. In other words the ESSCertIDv2:¶
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT {algorithm id-sha256},
certHash Hash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL
}
¶
is present as:¶
ESSCertIDv2 ::= SEQUENCE {
certHash OCTET STRING SIZE(32),
}
¶
The resulting XXXPrivateKeyObject is then, in an ASN.1-like notation:¶
XXXPrivateKeyObject ::= SEQUENCE {
spkiHash ESSCertIDv2,
-- Original PrivateXXXKeyObject
}
¶
For example for an ECC private key the original:¶
ECPrivateKey ::= INTEGER
¶
would become in extended form with cryptographic binding:¶
ECPrivateKeyExt ::= SEQUENCE {
spkiHash ESSCertIDv2,
value INTEGER
}
¶
For an RSA private key the original:¶
RSAPrivateKeyObject ::= SEQUENCE {
modulus [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- n
...
coefficient [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- inv(q) mod p
}
¶
would become in extended form with cryptographic binding:¶
RSAPrivateKeyObjectExt ::= SEQUENCE {
spkiHash ESSCertIDv2,
value SEQUENCE {
modulus [0] INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- n
...
coefficient [7] INTEGER OPTIONAL -- inv(q) mod p
}
}
¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
This document serves to document minor updates to the original PKCS #15 standard, there are no security considerations present beyond those in the original standard.¶