sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states "in the shortest time possible". 9. The new circumstances in the former Soviet Union and the growing warmth in East-West relations led to formal commitments to reduce strategic nuclear forces still further. In June 1992, Russia and the United States signed "The Joint Understanding on the Elimination of MIRV ICBMs and Further Reduction in Strategic Offensive Arms". This provided the basis for a new treaty, START-2, which was signed in January 1993. START-2 goes beyond START-I by setting a ceiling of about 4,500 warheads to be achieved by the end of the decade and a ceiling of 3,500 to be achieved by the year 2003 (or earlier if the United States assists Russia in dismantling its arsenal). Furthermore, START-2 introduces counting rules which essentially reflect actual numbers deployed rather than the number permissible and the treaty entails the greatest reductions in the weapons feared most by the other party. Thus, the United States will make large cuts in its submarine-launched ballistic missiles while Russia will make cuts in its heavy land-based ICBMs. 10. One aspect of the treaties which has caused some debate is the commitments by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. In fact, the NPT defines a nuclear weapons state as one "which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967". The weapons deployed outside Russia were manufactured on Russian territory within the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, even if these republics acquire - or have acquired - a technical veto over the launch of a weapon, they could still be categorized as non-nuclear weapons states (2). Only if they were able unilaterally to launch weapons on their soil would they be ineligible to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.(3) B. Proliferation Threats 11. The willingness of some republics to join the NPT has been called n December 1992 and involved a group of weapons experts who were prevented from departing from Moscow to North Korea by Russian special forces who stormed their aircraft. Some reports state that aboard the aircraft were 64 "missile experts" and others, 36 "nuclear experts"(13). 25. In general terms, the basic problem is that in the nuclear weapons field alone between 10,000 and 15,000 experts have access to classified information and 2,000 to 3,000 hold vital secrets. Their research budgets have been cut, wages are poor and living standards are declining. Despite the unquestioned responsibility of the overwhelming majority of weapons scientists, these circumstances naturally give rise to concern. A survey conducted for the "Moscow News" in October 1992, for instance, reported that two-thirds of the workforce in Russia's defence industry would like to find work abroad and as many as one fifth said that they would consider working for "rogue" regimes in the developing world (14). Indeed, a report on weapons proliferation released by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) in March 1993 acknowledges fears about leakage of material and expertise. While stating that there are no proven cases of illegal diversions, it expresses concern about nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation and establishes the prevention of such proliferation as a priority task. It says that there is concern about scientists leaving the former Soviet Union or other East European countries to participate in military programmes in developing nations (15). The report also warns of international crime and terrorism. "Serious alarm is arising due to the increasing interest of the international Mafia structures in the organization of illegal trade in fissionable and other especially dangerous materials"(16). 26. According to CIA Director James Woolsey, Russia's emigration and customs agencies are incapable of monitoring the potential flight of "more than the most critical personnel" to Third World nations pursuing chemical, nuclear or biological weapons (17). On the positive side, in January 1993, Russia enacted legislation which prohibits people with access to "state secrets" from leaving Russia for up to five years after their last contact with the information (18). C. Developments in the Nuclear Weapons Republics 27. As discussed earlier, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have strategic nuclear weapons based on their territory and have undertaken to renounce them. During the first half of 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons in these nations were removed and sent to Russia for storage and dismantlement. In the cases of Belarus and Kazakhstan, this process was conducted without delay but Ukraine expressed reservations about handing the weapons over to Russia for dismantlement. In March 1992 the President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, announced that Ukraine would cease the transport of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia on the grounds that Russia could not guarantee their destruction. President Kravchuk said "We cannot guarantee that weapons transported to Russia will not be destroyed or that they will not fall into undesirable hands ... we want guarantees that they cannot be used anywhere ... I do not want to make anybody else stronger." Ukraine, which has no nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, asked for Western assistance in setting up such facilities. 28. After several weeks of uncertainty, many meetings between Russian and Ukrainian officials, and Western refusal to assist Ukraine with nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, Ukraine resumed the transport of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. On 6 May 1992 the process was complete. 29. As regards strategic nuclear weapons, the four nuclear weapons republics agreed in Minsk at the end of 1991 to place them all under the "unified" control of the CIS. In practice, this gave command to the President of Russia and although the other republics had the right to consultation regarding use, they do not have a physical veto on their use. 30. In May 1992, Ukraine declared that